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Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been 
limited both by: (1) a narrow focus on the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine and 
(2) little regard for the historical context in which the doctrine developed. This 
special issue represents an effort to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, 
following Timothy Pawl’s definition of “Conciliar Christology,” we define 
“Conciliar Trinitarianism” as the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first 
seven Ecumenical Councils. Rather than speculative attempts at reconciling, say, 
sentences taken from the Athanasian Creed, or the common parlance of 
contemporary, Western Christians, the papers in this issue all address specifically 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. Second, the special issue brings together both analytic 
philosophers and patristics scholars in a format in which, in several cases, a scholar 
from one field responds to a scholar from another. We hope that this will help to 
jump-start some further conversations between scholars in analytic philosophy and 
in patristics, as we believe both fields can benefit from a deeper mutual engagement 
in the study of Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
Three papers happen to address the issue of whether, when conciliar texts speak 
generically of “God” they are referring to the Father (as in the Creedal phrase, “I 
believe in One God, the Father, Almighty…”), or to the Trinity as a whole. Declan 
O’Byrne (“On the Economic Focus of Conciliar Trinitarianism”) argues that, 
although Conciliar Trinitarianism affirms the consubstantiality of the Father and 
Son, and the full divinity of the Spirit, it identifies the One God with the Father, not 
the Trinity. To that extent, certain modern manuals of theology mischaracterize 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. He also argues conciliar texts are not concerned with the 
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metaphysics of the Trinity or the economy of salvation in isolation; rather claims 
about the immanent Trinity serve as grounds for claims about the economy of 
salvation. 
Dale Tuggy (“When and How in the History of Theology Did the Triune God 
Replace the Father as the Only True God?”) concedes that, strictly speaking, 
Conciliar Trinitarianism does not identify God with the Trinity, but argues this is 
nevertheless the best interpretation of council documents, when read in the context 
of later, non-ecumenical pronouncements and the theology of some of the councils’ 
most prominent members, specifically Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen. 
Additionally, he argues this was a natural development by the Gregories of the 
theology they inherited from Basil, which took “homoousious” to mean “same kind of 
thing” (an Aristotelian secondary ousia) and was therefore irremediably tri-theistic. 
This required a shift from Basil’s theology (which he argues was Unitarian) to a 
properly Trinitarian theology that takes “homoousious” to mean “same thing” (an 
Aristotelian primary ousia). 
Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (“God is Not a Thing: A Response to Dale Tuggy”) 
responds that Tuggy misunderstands the Aristotelian metaphysics through which 
he reads the Cappadocians; that he presupposes views about language they reject; 
that his textual evidence is in some cases circular; and that in other cases it consists 
of artifacts of English translations that are absent in the Greek, which Tuggy did not 
consult. According to Radde-Gallwitz, this leads to Tuggy’s implausible 
interpretation of “homoousious” as “same thing,” which is not how anybody in the 
fourth century actually understood that term. 
Four papers touch on the divine processions and the issue of subordinationism, 
among other topics. Mark Edwards (“Is Subordinationism a Heresy?”) notes that 
modern theologians often simply assume that subordinationism in any form is a 
heresy. If, however, we distinguish different kinds of subordination, it is not clear 
from scripture or conciliar tradition that every kind of subordination is indeed 
heretical. The tradition allows that the Son is causally and economically subordinate, 
but rules out the Son as ontologically subordinate. It does not clearly preclude, 
though, the Son’s being axiologically subordinate (subordinate in rank or status). 
In reply to Edwards’ paper, R.T. Mullins (“Trinity, Subordination, and Heresy: A 
Reply to Mark Edwards”) considers two arguments for the claim that some conciliar 
kinds of subordination imply some heretical kinds of subordination, which raises the 
worry that Conciliar Trinitarianism is incoherent.  
Timothy Pawl (“Conciliar Trinitarianism, Divine Identity Claims, and 
Subordination”) considers two questions concerning Conciliar Trinitarianism. 1. 
What relation does each divine person bear to the divine nature? 2. Do the divine 
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processions imply an objectionable kind of subordination? Pawl argues that neither 
the identity nor instantiation views fit the conciliar texts, and suggests this as a 
subject calling for further research. He also argues that the divine processions do not 
create an objectionable subordinationism. 
Alexis Torrance (“Defining and Supplementing Conciliar Trinitarianism: A 
Response to Timothy Pawl”) offers three comments in response to Pawl’s paper. 1. 
The conciliar texts are limited as a source for an articulation of trinitarian teaching. 
2. As each divine person is not strictly identical to the divine nature, so, Torrance 
argues, the divine nature is not strictly identical to the divine power, will, or energy. 
3. Torrance argues that on the topic of how the Holy Spirit proceeds, Pawl should 
give more weight to the first council of Constantinople’s exposition of faith, which 
says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, but does not imply any causal 
origin of the Spirit from the Son. 
Finally, a few papers trace an argument or theme in some theologian(s) central to 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. Dennis Bray (“Gregory Of Nazianzus’ Trinitarian 
Argument in Oration 23”) gives a close reading of Gregory Nazianzen for the claim 
that the Son and Spirit proceed from God’s essence, against the contrary claim made 
by Eunomius. Bray analyzes Nazianzen’s argument as a series of dilemmas 
concerning the number of divine persons and natures. Each dilemma either has a 
straight-forwardly embarrassing consequence for Eunomius, or leads to a further 
dilemma. But although the argument is intended as an attack on Eunomius’ 
theology specifically, it also illuminates Gregory’s positive theological position on 
the necessity of the Father’s production of the Son and Spirit. 
Giulio Maspero (“La perichoresis e la grammatica teologica dei primi sette Concili 
ecumenici”) traces the history of the term ‘perichoresis’ from Gregory Nazianzus, 
who uses the concept to describe the relation between Christ’s two natures, through 
Maximus the Confessor, who applies it to the deification of humans, and finally on 
to John Damascene, who applies it to the relation between the divine persons. 
Maspero argues that the concept unifies different areas of theology by rooting them 
ultimately in the Trinity. 
Anna Zhyrkova ("Can We Predicate of and Speak about God, and What Are the 
Rules for Doing So? On the Epistemological and Logical Premises of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism'') draws our attention to the Stoic philosophical backgrounds 
regarding logic and epistemology that were at play in the debate between Eunomius 
and Basil the Great. If, as she argues, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa’s understanding of 
discourse about the Trinity is the key for interpreting Conciliar Trinitarianism, then 
we are obliged to understand the logical and epistemological commitments that 
frame our interpretation of conciliar statements about the Trinity. Failing that, we 
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are likely to misinterpret statements about the Trinity in Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
Zhyrkova concludes that if we accept a Cappodocian apophatic stance regarding the 
divine essence, then this should influence how we interpret what seem to be positive 
claims about the Trinity in itself - for example, the distinction between what is 
common (divine essence) and what is not common (divine persons) - as found in 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
Richard Cross ("On the Interpretation of Church Councils: A Response to Anna 
Zhyrkova's Conciliar Trinitarianism") makes some distinctions in order to 
understand what is at issue in Zhyrkova’s article. He distinguishes a material 
question about the relation between the divine essence and divine attributes, and a 
formal question about what is common (the divine essence) and what is not common 
(the divine persons). Next, he distinguishes a thin account that is more apophatic, 
and a thick account that is more cataphatic. Lastly, Cross questions whether there is 
one hermeneutical 'key' (as Zhyrkova seems to suggest) to interpret the Ecumenical 
Councils. Whereas a thin account says there are a plurality ways to interpret 
conciliar statements, a thick account says there is one correct way. Using these 
distinctions, he contrasts what he calls Zyhrkova's "thin formalism, thin materialism, 
and thick conciliar hermeneutics," with what Cross argues was Basil the Great's 
"thick formalism, thin materialism, and thin conciliar hermeneutics." If Cross is 
right, then contra Zhyrkova there are some positive metaphysical claims to be found 
in Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
 
 
 
